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THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF IDEAS*
By GRANT HAMMOND*
The received wisdom is that an idea as such is not legally protected.
But now courts are embarking on a course which, at least in some
respects, embraces the proposition that ideas will sometimes be protected.
This essay suggests that these contemporary developments in the common
law world should be regarded with disquiet. Courts are sanctioning the
commercial exploitation of ideas in the face of an apparent desire of
human beings to reduce every aspect of themselves to divisible, saleable
commodities. Short term commercial gain is preferred to the timeless
importance of ideas in the seamless web of humanity. This essay protests
this trend, and looks at other possibilities in terms of social vision, theory,
and possible political response.
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I. INTRODUCTION
[Ideas are more powerful than] practical men ... commonly [understand] ... Soon or
1
late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or ill.

The thrust of intellectual property law2 is today usually
expressed in economic terms: the perceived need to enable creators
and producers of knowledge-based commodities to capture the full,
or at least fuller, benefits of those commodities. In broad terms,
there are two models which address this objective in contemporary
legal systems. The first, the protective model, creates a series of
discrete protective laws which give proprietary protection 3 on closely
defined terms. The second, the state support model, gives creators
direct support or rewards, in one form or another, but allows
relatively free appropriation by producers. Both models endeavour
to encourage creation and dissemination of intellectual creations.
The protective model allows greater rewards and more sophisticated
interests to be created.
Common law jurisdictions have historically adopted the
protective model. Several problems are apparent with it. First, not
everybody accepts an overtly economic rationale; cultural and
political objectives are inadequately accommodated. Second, there
is a long standing controversy as to whether the model actually

1 This passage is adopted from the final passage of Keynes's monumentally influential
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World,
1964).

2 I use intellectual property here in the large sense, as covering patents, copyright,
trademarks, industrial designs, and any judicially created cause of action which has the effect
of protecting intellectual creations.
3 To an economist, a property right arises whenever a right has the effect of creating
some degree of exclusivity, regardless of the legal form of that right.
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achieves its stated economic goals
Third, at least in the eyes of
the Third World, it is seen as a significant weapon of repression
against members of that unfortunate community. Fourth, the model
is increasingly being asked to accommodate more than it was
designed for, and probably far more than it can ever satisfactorily
accommodate. More and more people are trying to accommodate
more and more things under the protective umbrella of intellectual
property law to achieve private economic gain.
It is an aspect of this last problem which provokes this essay.
A central tenet of our law has been that an idea as such is not
legally protected. Hence, the law historically refused to support the
legal commodification of ideas. But now the courts appear to be
embarking on a course which does, at least in some respects,
embrace the proposition that ideas will sometimes be protected. If
this is so, it is a critical departure in our law deserving of rigorous
attention. The relevant questions are, I think, the following. First,
is it correct to say that the historic attitude of common law judges
has been that ideas are not protected? Second, if that is so, how
far has that broad proposition been modified in recent years? Third,
if there has been some change or modification of stance, why has
that occurred? Fourth, what values are involved in this development? Fifth, where should the law be going in contemporary
circumstances? Sixth, what kind of legal strategy is most appropriate
to the particular legal objectives identified?
It is as well to declare biases, or at least suspicions, at the
outset. It strikes me that many of the central problems with the
legal protection of ideas can be illustrated by the whaling problem
in Melville's Moby Dick.5 In that extraordinary work, a whale is

4 On the debate over copyright, see S. Breyer, "The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A
Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs" (1970) 84 Harv. L. Rev.
281. On patents, see R. Merges, "Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic
Perspectives on Innovation" (1988) 76 Cal. L. Rev. 805; R. Eisenberg, "Patents and the
Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use" (1989) 56 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1017. Generally, see D. Vaver, "Intellectual Property Today. Of Myths and Paradoxes" (1990)
69 Can. Bar Rev. 98.
5 H. Melville, Moby-Dick or, the Whale, L Mansfield & H. Vincent, eds (New York:
Hendricks House, 1952) [hereinafter Moby-Dick].
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harpooned but gets away.6 It is harpooned again by a second crew
and taken. There is then a legal dispute, Whose fish is it? Melville
cites a Dutch enactment of 1695. It is of apparently admirable
brevity and states: "I. A Fast-Fish belongs to the party fast to it.
II. A Loose-Fish is fair game for anybody who can soonest catch
it.' 7 But Melville then notes, "[W]hat plays the mischief with this
masterly code [is that it needs a] vast volume of commentaries to
expound it."8 He then provides some wonderfully exotic examples:
serfs, mortgages, and Ireland to John Bull are "fast-fish"; America
before Columbus, ideas, and the Rights of Man are "loose-fish." As
to the solution to the whale problem, the fish could be no one's
property. Or, if one had to make a choice, the common law would
give preference to possession, that is, to9 that person who had, or
appeared to have, the fish fast alongside.
Melville's insights suggest three dilemmas. First, society
recognizes both whales and ideas. Lawyers, therefore, have to
ascribe some consequences to that recognition, whether we like it or
not. Second, the lawyer's problem with ideas is the practical one of
whether a fish can be "both fast and loose, so to speak."10 And that
complication probably means that terse law would be no law. Any
law on this subject will be difficult and probably complex. Third,
and this really gets to the heart of the matter, there is the
underlying tension between humanism and an economic vision of
things. It was once said that Captain Ahab had become "a fast fish.
The Universe has got its barb in him. His humanity is transfixed."11
But as Melville himself wrote about Ralph Waldo Emerson: "Be his
6 Ibid. Melville's Billy Budd has also attracted the interest of academic lawyers. See C.
Reich, 'The Tragedy of Justice in Billy Budd" (1967) 56 Yale L Rev. 369; W. Domnarski,
'Law-Literature Criticism: Charting a Desirable Course with Billy Budd" (1984) 34 J. Leg.
Ed. 702.
7 Moby-Dick, supra, note 5 at 393.
8 bid. at 393-94.
9 I am indebted to C. Rose for reminding me of this chapter in Moby Dick. See C.
Rose, "Possession as the Origin of Property" (1985) 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73 at 88.
10

Ibid.

11 W. Sedgwick, Herman Melville. The Tragedy of Mind (New York: Russell & Russell,
1962) at 120.
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stuff begged, borrowed, or stolen or of his own domestic
manufacture, he is an uncommon man ...
The truth is that we are

all sons, or nephews, or 12
great nephews of those who go before us.
No man is his own sire."
In short, ideas are part of the seamless web of humanity.
Breaking pieces out of that web, unless for an overwhelming
justification, robs us of part of ourselves.
Absent such a
justification, we allow ourselves to be taken on the barb of
commercial exploitation of ideas. This problem is particularly acute
in an age which is increasingly commodifying the self and
encouraging individuals to turn every aspect of their being into a
reducible, divisible, saleable commodity. If merely to think of the
idea of a play about the burning of Atlanta or how to present
oneself as the latest pop fad (let alone e=mc2) is to be
appropriable, the great chain of humanity is broken. At such a
point, our humanity is truly "transfixed." It is with that ultimate
concern in mind that I approach this subject-matter.
H. THE BASIC PARADIGM
It is as well to begin with the fundamental principle.
Perhaps the best known statement of it is found in a 1918 judgment
of Justice Brandeis: "The general rule of law is that the noblest of
human productions - knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions and
ideas - become, after voluntary communication to others, free as
the air to common use."13 The proposition as thus enunciated is
complex. It has philosophical, economic, cultural, and political
dimensions. All of these dimensions find practical expression in a
legal bird cage mechanism.
Consider the case of Einstein. He is dubious about
Newton's views on physics. He thinks - has the idea if you like that the better truth is e=mc2 . He has not yet told the world or
anybody so, although he has written out his formula with a few
12 Letter from H. Melville to E. Duyckink (3 March 1849). Reproduced in Moby-Dick,

supra, note 5 at 569.
13 International News Service (INS) v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) at 250

[hereinafter InternationalNews].
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explanatory notes. From the standpoint of the individual, the bird
cage operates as a protection. Einstein cannot be forced to disclose
his idea. The bird cage affirms his right to his innermost thoughts
and ideas. In general, Einstein is under no duty to disclose.
However, he may be in a position where he has voluntarily assumed
a duty to disclose. He may be employed as a paid researcher, and
he may have undertaken to commit his ideas to paper for his
employers. And if he is on a university faculty, he will be bound by
the scientific ethic which requires, even in the absence of a contract,
a member of the academy to disseminate his ideas and research.
The bird cage thus gives the individual the freedom to think and the
right to assess the maturity of an idea before it is released.
From the standpoint of society, the position is more complex
again. Einstein cannot be required to disclose his idea unless he
has undertaken to do so in response to some ethical requirement or
assumed obligation. But society offers no economic incentive to
disclose. It may perhaps confer personal glory, or at least public
acknowledgement, for whatever that means to Einstein. Society
does not, however, confer an economic reward because it fears that
Einstein may somehow get a monopoly on e=mc2 and whatever it
might be applied to. Instead, the idea becomes part of the general
heritage of humankind, and any person can make use of it in
theoretical or applied modes. Indeed, more accurately stated, what
Einstein has come up with is a scientific discovery. It would be
anomalous to deprive the public of something it had always enjoyed,
but had not theretofore recognised. However, society could, and
does, reward the application of that discovery. Hence, rewarding
Franklin for recognising the electrical nature of lightning goes too
far; rewarding someone for creating a lightning rod does not.
The result of the bird cage mechanism for legal theory is as
follows. Einstein can exercise a self-help remedy by not divulging
what is in his mind. He can protect his idea in his private papers
and if he tells somebody about it in confidence, though probably on
conscience rather than proprietary grounds. But once the cage door
is voluntarily opened, he has no proprietary rights in the idea.
Public dedication has taken place. The dedicated idea is not
appropriable by him nor by anybody else, although it ought to be
attributed to him. Neither, it appears, can he rely on some kind of
non-proprietary relational theory to follow his work. Just as
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Einstein has no proprietary rights of paternity, he has no following
rights. As an idea is applied and acquires further value, no
compensation of an economic character is afforded him. He can,
however, get a patent if he can think of a practical application of
his idea. The text of his explanation, but not the underlying
theorem, will then attract copyright.
In the overall result, the bird cage model avoids the zero
sum trap. Both Einstein and society get some advantages and some
disadvantages. A complex bargain is struck between a given
individual and the rest of society. I have however probably said
enough to indicate the very real intellectual and practical difficulties
in this area of the law. What is an idea? What is the expression
of it? Should we grant protection to intellectual creations, and if
so, for how long and on what terms? And how do we turn our
answers to those questions into workable legal formulas? The
answers we give are a window both into our vision of society and
the workings of the legal mind.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE BASIC PARADIGM
It is useful to ask, How did this construct come into being?
Something like this is rarely, if ever, created in a vacuum in the law.
Holmes thought that the life of law lies in experience.1 4 Events,
not ideas, drive legal development. Others place a greater emphasis
on the primacy of ideas.15 The better answer may be that the life
of the law lies in the way events and ideas interact to produce
particular constructs 6 In any event, Justice Brandeis's general
proposition cannot be understood apart from the historical context
and the ideas about legal ideas which swirled around those events.
The foundations of our present day intellectual property law
came about in the transition from the seventeenth to the eighteenth

14 O.W. Holmes, The Common Law, M. Howe, ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & Company,
1963) at 5.
15

H. Berman, Law and Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983).

16 P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford:
1979).

Clarendon Press,
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The transition was one from a state in which an allcentury.
powerful monarchy granted economic favours for its own purposes
to one which recognised more directly the rights of individuals. At
the same time, the recognition came slowly and painfully that it
would be necessary in the new order to balance private right and
public need. Patents, the exclusive right to the fruits of a new
manner of manufacture, came into being after judges struck down
the huge privilege of Crown granted and enforced monopolies in
trade. The judicial victory was endorsed by Parliament in the
And copyright, the right to
famous Statute of Monopolies.1 7
replicate a work, eventually came to be vested in authors, not
publishers. The system of rights turned itself end for end and then
struggled into a precarious balance between public and private
rights. The story of these developments is one of the most
fascinating chapters in legal history, and its jurisprudential
significance is routinely missed. I can here only sketch these
developments.
We need to go back to England in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries! 8 The printing press had been invented, and
it was a time of flourishing literary endeavour. It was the age of
Johnson, Pope, Sheridan, and Swift. But there was a heated debate,
what Samuel Johnson called "the great question concerning Literary
Property. 19 The problem was that the Crown had for many years
Only books registered with the
strictly controlled printing.
Stationers Company could be printed, and only then within the
guild. This amounted both to a form of censorship and a restrictive
17 Statute of Monopolies (U.K.), 21 Jac. 1, c. 3. See Darcy v. Allin (1602), Moo. K.B.
671, 74 E.R. 1131 (K.B.).
18 1 am particularly indebted for much of what follows in this section to J. Whicher, The
Creative Arts and the JudicialProcess (New York: Federal Legal Publications, 1965) c.5; B.

Kaplan, An Unhuried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967). See
also L. Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press,

1968); F. Siebert, Freedom of the Pressin England1476-1776 (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1952); J. Feather, 'The History of Copyright and the Book Trade" (1988) 12 European

Intellectual Prop. Rev. 377; S. Ricketson, The Law of IntellectualProperty (Melbourne: Law
Book, 1984) c.4; G. Hammond, MThe Origins of the Equitable Duty of Confidence" (1979) 8
Anglo-American L. Rev. 71.
19 J. Boswell, Life of Johnson, R.W. Chapman, ed. (London:

1970) at 310.

Oxford University Press,
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trade practice. It also deprived authors of whatever natural law
rights they might have in their works.
Of course, it could not last. As early as Milton in 1644,
authors began to assert that they must have some kinds of rights in
their works. 20 They were becoming less dependent- on patrons.
And happily, creators displayed then the same contempt for legalism
they have always displayed. The law was routinely disobeyed.
Things like the probate inventories in England show that roughly
one third of the books in England were not in fact enrolled and a
flourishing black market and underground traffic existed in copyright.
Lawyers actually conveyed what we would today describe as
copyright interests regardless of the formal state of the law.
The licensing system eventually ended in 1694, thereby
opening the way for two important new streams of legal
development, the law of libel and the modern law of copyright. The
Stationers petitioned Parliament upon the loss of the advantages of
a restrictive trade practice. No longer having rights as publishers,
they came up with the notion that authors should be protected and
have copyright. This was not public spiritedness on their part. If
copyright was a property right, it could then be assigned to the
publishers, thereby giving them indirectly what they no longer had
directly. Faced with pleading publishers and indignant authors,
Parliament capitulated. In 1709, the famous Statute of Anne was
enacted.21
This set the stage for some very difficult litigation. The
statute did not expressly abrogate pre-existing common law rights, as
contemporary Commonwealth copyright statutes now do.22 Hence,
these critical questions were raised: What, if any, common law
rights did authors have in published or unpublished works prior to
the Statute of Anne? And if there was a common law copyright, was
20 E. Sirluck, ed., Complete Prose Works of John Milton, vol. 1 (New Haven:

Yale

University Press, 1959) at 486. F. Mackinnon, "Notes on the History of English Copyright"
in the Oxford Companion to English Literature, 3d ed. (London: Oxford University Press,
1946) 881 at 882 n. 3 credits Blackstone with the first published usage of the term "copyright."
21 Statute of Anne (U.K.), 8 Anne, c. 19. Swift, Addison, and Steele took some part in
the drafting. See Donaldson v. Beckett (1774), 2 Bro. P.C. 129, 1 E.R. 837 at 843.
22 See, for instance, section 5 of the Copyright Act 1962 (N.Z.). The same section
preserves the jurisdiction with respect to breaches of confidence.
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it perpetual? And perhaps most importantly of all, what legal effect
did the passing of the Statute of Anne have on any pre-existing
rights?
The matter could not be resolved until after the
twenty-eight year copyright period on a work had expired and
somebody had allegedly pirated it. In the meantime, three things
happened.
First, there was an ongoing debate amongst lawyers and
intellectuals over the nature of copyright. On the one hand, the old
licensing system had implied that, however imperfectly, authors had
something. And to them, it seemed that natural justice, in Milton's
terms, required that protection of some kind be given. On the
other hand, the notion that an author could withhold work at that
person's caprice did not seem right; still less did the idea that
Shakespeare should have a perpetual copyright in his works. 23
Second, some went to the Chancellors and obtained
injunctions restraining the publication of unpublished manuscripts
which had been surreptitiously purloined. These cases do not rest
on the fully reasoned form of judgment we know today. The
reports are brief and, in theoretical terms, can be explained either
as the exercise of the Chancellors' conscience or the protection of
a property interest, the only kind of interest protected by
injunction. 24
Third, a theoretician was now at work. William Blackstone,
later Professor of Law at Oxford, was working towards the first
systematic treatise on the laws of England.25 He had to confront
both the general nature of property and this difficult form of
intangible property. He espoused a natural law theory of literary
23 See Whicher, supra, note 18 at 113. My edition of Boswell, supra, note 19 at 310 has
Johnson in no doubt about the practice: "It has always been understood by the trade, that
he, who buys the copy-right of a book from the author, obtains a perpetual property; and
upon that belief, numberless bargains are made to transfer that property after the expiration
of the statutory term."
24 Millar v. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. 2303, 98 E.R. 201 at 253 (K.B.) [hereinafter Millar

cited to E.R.]. The cases include Webb v. Rose (1732), 4 Burr. 2330, 98 E.R. 216; Pope v.
Curl (1741), 2 Atk. 342, 26 E.R. 608 (Ch.); Duke of Queensbury v. Shebbeare (1758), 2 Eden
329, 28 E.R. 924 (Ch.).

25 See S. Milsom, 'the Nature of Blackstone's Achievement" (1981) 1 Ox. J. Leg. Stud.
1; K. Vandevelde, 'The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the
Modem Concept of Property" (1980) 29 Buffalo L. Rev. 325.
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property, adopting the Lockean perspective that a man is entitled to
the fruits of his labours. Therefore, an author should have the
profits to be made from the commercial exploitation of his own
creations. From the standpoint of authority, there were no decisions
explicitly recognising authors' rights in their creations. But the old
licensing acts and the equity decisions I have mentioned seemed to
Blackstone to be based on the assumption that such common law
rights existed. The Statute of Anne, as he read it, only gave
additional remedies. Hence, when the statutory time limit had
expired, the common law right would continue.26
Blackstone appears to be the first to suggest the idea of
"public dedication" as a watershed. Where did he get this idea? A
doctrine of dedication with respect to land had developed earlier 2in7
the century and Blackstone seems to have extended it by analogy.
But he complicated matters by classifying copyright in his taxonomy
of property rights acquired "by occupancy," along with easements of
light, air, and water. In doing so, he created a logical difficulty
which he had overlooked. Rights of that kind were subject to a
doctrine of abandonment by non-user.28 It would follow that an
author had rights only so long as the work was kept in print. If
this was so, the common law right could not be "perpetual" as he
argued.29
Blackstone had the support and encouragement of William
Murray, later to become Lord Mansfield, Lord Chief Justice of the

Court of King's Bench. Murray moved in literary circles and he was
well aware that conveyancers had been treating copyrights as
property rights in wills and attending to the sale of them before

26 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 2 (Portland: Thomas B.

Wait & Co., 1807) at 405-7.
27 Lad, v. Shepherd (1735), 2 Strange 1004, 93 E.R. 997 (K.B.); Queen v. Inhabitantsof
Hornsey (1713), 10 Mod. 150, 88 E.R. 670 (KB.).
28 J. Kent, Commentarieson AmericanLaw, vol. 3, 12th ed. by O.W. Holmes, Jr. (Boston:

Little, Brown, and Company, 1884) at 448 n. " and the English authorities there collected.
29 Some Judges noted the point. See Ashton J. in Millar, supra, note 24 at 257; Gould
J. in Donaldson v. Beckett, supra, note 21; Cobbett's ParliamentaryHistory of England, vol. 17

(New York: AMS Press, 1966) at 984-85.
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30
1700. As a barrister, he advised on some of these matters.
Murray thought that on this point practice spoke louder than words,
and he was sure that the common law right existed in practice. And
from a moral perspective, he thought there ought to be such a right.
Hence, the decision in Millar v. Taylor"1 would have come as no
surprise to Murray's contemporaries. In Millar v. Taylor, one of the
few split decisions ever handed down by Lord Mansfield's court, it
was held (3-1) that (1) the plaintiff owned the common law
copyright in the work; (2) this right was not lost by publication; and
(3) that the Statute of Anne did not abrogate that right 3 2 Millar v.
Taylor is a gold-mine of jurisprudential argument, as fine minds
came to grips with the problem at the level of first principle.
Mr. Justice Yates delivered a powerful dissenting judgment.
He insisted that there was no common law right in published works.
His Honour saw things this way. I have an idea. Whilst I keep it
to myself it is mine. But now I communicate the idea to you. It is
now "our" idea. I cannot stop your mind from working on the idea
or using it. Because I communicated it to you, I had no intention
that it should be solely mine. The idea' becomes the common
property of me and you and, putatively, of all mankind. Nobody
had or was suggesting that the English language could be owned.
Since neither the ideas (when published) nor the words (published
or unpublished) belong to me as an author, there was nothing I as
an author could properly lay claim to in a published work under this
statute. Thus, whether Parliament realised it or not, what it did was
to create a right where none had existed in the Statute of Anne.
And that right could be no longer than the statute prescribed.
Moreover, property was not absolute in the sense being
contended for by Mr. Blackstone, who appeared as counsel. "All
property has its proper limits,"33 asserted the learned Judge. In the
case of inventions (what we now call patents), it had already been
determined that the inventor of the air pump had a property in the

30 See his judgment in Millar, supra, note 24 at 257.
31 Supra, note 24.

33

/Aid.at 230.
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machine, but not in the air, which was common to all. But notice
the explanation for the grant. His Honour reasoned that "invention
is the discovery of a vacant property, and the inventor then bestows
cultivation upon it."34 Thus did Mr. Justice Yates square himself
with Locke's labour theory of property! And since he claimed
property is "founded upon occupancy,"35 this also reinforced his
argument that nobody could own the idea.
The majority judges would have none of this. The only
sense in which my ideas, having been communicated to you, can be
said to be "ours" relates to the interrelated workings of your mind
and mine. If I communicate my ideas to the public in a book, I
have externalized those ideas. Any economic value then belongs to
me. I may have given my ideas to the public, but I have not
authorised anyone to make and market copies of my work.
But what is it that the author could actually protect? One
possibility was only the identical work. The majority judges thought
the net would have to be wider than that. Mr. Justice Willes said,
"[Whilst] bona fide variations, translations, and abridgements are
different [from copies]; and, in respect of the property, may be
considered as new works ... colourable and fraudulent variations will
not do."36 But, of course, the seed of the problem was thus sown.
Once one admits (as all the judges did) that ideas as such are not
appropriable and (as the majority did) that the author owned more
than the exclusive right to make and market identical copies of his
work, the issue of ideas is never able to be set to one side. And
Lord Mansfield could also see a related problem which has become
of great contemporary relevance. In his An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding,John Locke had suggested that "the Mind
often exercises an active Power in the making ... several
combinations. For it being once furnished with simple Ideas, it can
put them together in several Compositions, and so make variety of
complex Ideas, without examining whether they exist so together in

34 Ibid.
35
36

Ibid.
Ibid. at 205.
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Nature. And hence I think these ideas are called notions."3 7 It
was presumably this which Lord Mansfield had in mind when he
38
said in Millar v. Taylor that copyright "is a property in notion."
In the result, authors now had both the Statute of Anne and
perpetual common law copyright. But the triumph was to be
short-lived. The House of Lords several years later, in Donaldson
v. Beckett,39 overruled Millar v. Taylor by a margin of one vote.
Lord Mansfield did not vote out of reasons of delicacy. There is
great debate about that case and which of the eleven judges actually
voted for what propositions. The various law reports are, at best,
confusing and even contradictory. The casting vote was that of Lord
Camden, a bitter political foe of Lord Mansfield. But subsequent
judges have seen the decision as holding that the Statute of Anne
pre-empted the common law right in published works.
The paradigm was thus set. Practically every intellectual
property law case of any importance which has been decided since
that time rehearses arguments which were traversed in this case,
although it is rarely cited nowadays. Moreover, this legal paradigm
mirrored changes in political philosophy and human behaviour. As
Leo Braudy has pointed out, the Lockean tradition argued that you
are your own property, and therefore only you can sell yourself. 40
It was on this premise that assertive human beings began to
consider their minds and their careers as theirs to shape and sell. A
road potentially leading to legal realisation of the "commodity self'
41
had begun.

J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, P. Nidditch, ed. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1975) Book II, c. 22, para. 2.
38

Millar, supra, note 24 at 251.

39

Donaldson v. Beckett, supra, note 21.
40 L Braudy, The Frenzy of Renown:
University Press, 1986) at 370.
41 Ibid. at 371.

Fame and Its History (New York:

Oxford
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IV. THE EXTENT OF LEGAL PROTECTION OF IDEAS
Did this bird cage mechanism, as evolved, become a central
plank elsewhere in the law? And has it been challenged? In
considering these questions, we should be careful not to look for the
obvious. Historically, lawyers have rarely assaulted citadels. They
work obliquely, changing categories and creating chimera. Dramatic
change cannot be lived with. And we should recall the inevitable
problem that individual counsel and, at least, trial court judges are
charged with looking downwards at individual cases. It is the direct
task of scholars to try to see the big picture. I cannot, in a single
article, demonstrate the position in detail in the entire body of our
law. This has to be a sketch.
It is useful to imagine a horizontal line running from left to
right. This line is labelled an "idea." There are various legal
vehicles ranged along that line. Those which give the strongest legal
protection for ideas are towards the left hand end of the line. The
protection gets progressively weaker as we traverse right. I intend
to pan a camera along that spectrum to get a sense of the overall
situation.
A. Patents
Patents are the strongest form of intellectual property right
known to our law. A patent is a state-supported monopoly. Even
the creator who unknowingly creates the same invention at great
expense can be restrained from marketing that invention by the
holder of a valid patent. It is often said that a patent protects
ideas. This is not really so, or at least the proposition requires
careful clarification.
Take the case of Professor Morse. He conceived the
electromagnetic telegraph. He could have sat on his idea and told
no one of it. It would then have gone to his grave with him. No
one would have inherited the idea, unless, like the Countess in
Tchaikovsky's opera The Queen of Spades, it was posthumously
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imparted to a young gambler in a dream.4 2 Reliance on dreams
does not advance us much. Professor Morse was more practical.
He applied for a patent. 43 And he did what every practical person
who applies for a patent does, he over-claimed. His largest claim
was to "the exclusive right to every improvement where the motive
power is the electric or galvanic current, and the result is the
marking or printing of intelligible characters, signs, or letters at a
distance." 44 This the court would not allow. Morse could not
patent the discovery that electric current could be used this way.
But his lesser claims, to the application of this knowledge, could
stand. Patent law holds, depending on the jurisdiction, either as a
matter of express statutory proscription or of judicial decisions, that
patentable subject-matter must be new, not merely heretofore
unknown. And there is a distinct time limit in patent statutes on
the period for which the patent can be worked.
So what we have in patent law is a partial bird cage. The
idea once released is to the patent office, which often trims the
excess weight off the bird before releasing it, sheathed in relatively
impregnable armour for a set period of time. The armour then selfdestructs and the bird becomes fair game.
It might be thought that the discovery/application distinction
would be difficult to apply in practice, but I do not think that has
proved to be so. But it does lead to heartburn amongst scientists
and engineers. The first to discover gets no reward; the first to
invent does. Should we reach further back to the fundamental
thinking stage? The objection to this was forcibly put by Justice
Douglas:
Unless the ...
claim ...
has been reduced to production of a product shown to be
useful, the metes and bounds of that monopoly are not capable of precise
delineation. It may engross a vast, unknown and perhaps unknowable area. Such

42 1 owe this reference to J. Phillips, Introduction to Intellectual Property Law (London:
Butterworths, 1986) at 10.
43 The facts are taken from O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854).
44 Ibid. at 112.
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a patent may confer power to block
off whole areas of scientific development
45
without compensating public benefit.

B. Property
The next strongest claim would be that an idea is recognised
as a property right in and of itself, even without any statutory right.
That has never been the law. But in recent years, there have been
attempts in North America to say that information, and perhaps
even ideas, are property for the purpose of general criminal law
provisions.4 6 For instance, in the United States, insider trading has
been prosecuted under the general wire fraud provisions relating to
transmission of information.
More significantly, in Canada, a
prosecution of a person under the general theft provision of the
Canadian Criminal Code4 7 for improperly reading information off a
computer screen, without in any way interfering with the program or
the computer, was upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal.48 It
took an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada to set the matter
to rights.4 9
The problem here lies in a crudely instrumental approach to
lawyering in response to concerns by both business and state
interests about leaks and espionage with respect to sensitive
information. Classifying this subject-matter as property is seen as a
quick fix. If the prosecution in the Canadian case to which I have
referred had ultimately succeeded, even if e=mc2 had been what
was on the screen, it might well have been protected by the criminal
law. Criminal law proscription is a dubious proposition in this

45

Brewer v. Mason, 383 U.S. 519 (1966) at 534.

46 See G. Hammond, 'Theft of Information" (1984) 100 L.Q. Rev. 252; "Theft of
Information" (1988) 104 L.Q. Rev. 527; 'The Misappropriation of Commercial Information
in the Computer Age" (1986) 64 Can. Bar Rev. 342 [hereinafter Misappropriation];"Electronic
Crime in Canadian Courts" (1986) 6 Ox. J. Leg. Stud. 145; "R v. Stewart: The Final
Judgment?" (1989) 11 Sup. Ct L. Rev. 421.
47 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
48 R. v. Stewart (1983), 42 O.R. (2d) 225, 74 C.P.R. (2d) 1.
49 R. v. Stewart, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 963, 50 D.L.R. (4th) 1.
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subject area. However, if it is undertaken, very careful delineation
is required.5°
C. Copyright
Earlier in this essay, I left copyright at the point where it
had evolved by statute into a very particular form of property right,
and with the distinction between an idea and its expression drawn.
The subsequent history of the distinction has not been entirely
satisfactory. Some judges have avoided the issue and have been
openly result-oriented. Lawsuits are determined on the basis of an
ad hoc categorisation of the subject-matter as an idea or its
expression. The reasons for the categorisation, then, have more to
do with perceived general merits than intellectual integrity.
Other lawyers have taken the distinction very seriously
indeed and have tried to find ways of giving it content. In 1930,
Judge Learned Hand, one of the giants of intellectual property law,
suggested an "abstractions" test:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of
increasing-generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left
out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what
the play is about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point
in these series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise
the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their
expression, his property is never extended.51

This test does not, however, tell the judge where to draw the line.
It is only an analytical technique used in comparing the plaintiff's
and the defendant's works. Professor Chafee, in 1945, thought that
the protection covers the "pattern" of a work.52 Subsequently,
Professor Nimmer stood on the shoulders of both. He suggested
that Judge Learned Hand's idea that a work can be broken into
different levels of abstraction be combined with Professor Chafee's

50 In the Crimes Bill 1989 (N.Z.), the proposed offence of taking a trade secret, clause
18, is very wide, as is the definition of "property' in clause 176.
51 Nichols v. UniversalPictures Corp., 45 F.2d. 119 at 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
52 7- Chafee, "Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I" (1945) 45 Colo. L. Rev. 503.
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idea that substantial similarity can be determined by comparing
common elements at a level that is still abstract, but still concrete
enough to constitute an expression.53 Professor Nimmer in fact
undertook an exercise in which he compared Romeo and Juliet with
West Side Story. He identified thirteen common elements and
concluded that those common elements form a pattern sufficiently
concrete to provide a basis for a finding that the two works are
substantially similar. But the reach of the substantial similarity test
can be gauged by the remark of the judge who recently said, "I
would think there would be a substantial taking of 54Gone with the
Wind if somebody just took the burning of Atlanta."
This, in turn, suggests the second big contemporary problem
with copyright law. There has been unremitting pressure by
commercial interests to accommodate more ideas within the
protective umbrella of copyright. The basic argument has been, if
something looks alike, it is alike. Independent effort is discounted
or discarded. Copyright then begins to look more like patent law,
but without the safeguards of that body of law. I will give three
illustrations here.
The first is the attempt to revive, in copyright law, Lord
Mansfield's arguments about the protectability of a notion. An
instance of such an attempt is Green v. BroadcastingCorporationof
New Zealand.55 Hughie Green, who evolved the essential features
of the television show "Opportunity Knocks," complained that the
Broadcasting Corporation had misappropriated certain ideas of his:
some catch-phrases, the employment of sponsors, and the use of
"clapometers" to measure studio audience reaction. These, he said,
made up the central aggregation of ideas or format about the show.
53 M. Nimmer, Niminmer on Copyright, vol. 3 (New York: Matthew Bender, 1990) para.
13.03. The best overall discussion of the law in the United States relating to the protection
of ideas is contained in chapter 16 of this volume. See also A. Christie, "Copyright Protection
for Ideas: An Appraisal of the Traditional View" (1984) 10 Monash U.L. Rev. 175.
54 Roy Export Co. v. Columbia BroadcastingSystem, 503 F. Supp. 1137 at 1145 (U.S.

Dist. Ct. 1980), aff'd 672 F.2d. 1095 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982). The
comment was made in the context of a suit involving a compilation of excerpts of Chaplin
film clips for use at the Academy Awards. The burning of Atlanta may have occupied ten or

fifteen minutes out of perhaps four hours in the original film. The legal point of principle
is that the test for substantial infringement is qualitative, not quantitative.
55 [1988] 2 N.Z.LR. 490 (C.A.).
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He said he had copyright in this aggregation. The Court of Appeal
drew a distinction between a general idea or concept (which is not
protected by copyright) and something delineated by or attended
with detail, pattern, or incidents sufficiently substantial to attract
copyright in the whole. This test was not met in this case, and Mr.
Green's claim was dismissed. The Privy Council recently upheld that
decision.5 6 But notice what has happened. The door has been
opened at least to some claims to ideas in copyright. We now have
to grapple with two distinctions, namely between general ideas and
other ideas, and between ideas and expression. The first distinction
is apparently a question of degree. But the courts may well be
offering us a contradiction 57in terms. If an idea is sufficiently
developed, is it still an idea?
My second illustration is the so-called indirect copying cases.
In one New Zealand case,58 the plaintiff successfully developed a
tray for export of kiwifruit. The Kiwifruit Marketing Authority
produced a standard specification based on that tray.
The
defendants, then, independently developed a tray of the same colour
and similar form to the plaintiff's, using only the Authority's
specification.
Similarity came about because the industry
specification was compulsory and inevitably took an independent
designer to a very similar, if not identical, conclusion. But the
Court of Appeal was not impressed. In principle, it said, a
reproduction may result from indirect copying, even 5 though
such a
9
holding patently gives protection to the central idea.
56 [1989] 2 All E.R. 1056, [1989] 3 N.Z.L.R. 18 (P.C.).

57 Ibid. See also Wilson v. Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand, (1988) 12 I.P.R.
173 (N.Z.H.C.) in which a format claim in copyright succeeded; Zeccola v. Universal City
Studios, (1982) 67 F.L.R. 225 (Aust. Fed. Ct.); Heragon Py Ltd v. Australian Broadcasting
Commission, (1975) 7 A.LR. 233 (S.C.); J. Stuckey-Clarke, "Remedies for the
Misappropriation of Creative Ideas" (1989) 11:9 European Intellectual Prop. Rev. 333.
58 FrankM. Winstone (Merchants)Ltd v. Plix ProductsLtd, (1984) 3 I.P.R. 390 (H.C.).
59 [1985] 1 N.Z.LR. 376, 5 I.P.R. 156 (CA.) Professor Jim Lahore took the same view
of the case: 'To give protection to a particular concept of functional design in this manner
goes beyond the proper scope of copyright law. What was protected was essentially the
plaintiff's idea for the system of eight counts which became standard for the industry." See
"Copyright, Style, Ideas and Functional Design" (1985) 7:3 European Intellectual Prop. Rev.
83 at 86. But see also British Leyland Motor Corporationv. Armstrong Patents Co. Ltd [1986]
2 W.L.R. 400, 6 I.P.R. 102 (H.L.).
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The third and the most difficult subject area involves
computer software cases. It did not take all that long for courts and
legislators to solve the first generation software issue. Both object
code and source code were held to amount to a literary work or a
translation or adaptation of it and, accordingly, to have copyright
protection.' ° The second generation cases are concerned with
screen representations. Software innovators have claimed that they
have copyright protection in the screens, menus, and file structures

that are an integral part of the look and feel of the particular
programme. At base, the claim is to the intellectual structure and
graphics (the ideas) which make up the external visual language of
the programme.
Take the famous trash can in the Apple Macintosh graphics.
If company A creates that image using programme X, does company

B infringe by creating the identical image through a new programme
Y? North American courts have been divided in these cases. Some
have held that this conduct is copying.61 At such a point, the
birdcage is gone and Justice Brandeis's principle with it. Whether
humanity would consider the Macintosh user-interface a noble idea
might be debatable, but noble or not, it would belong to Apple and
only Apple for fifty years.

Traditionally, courts have said they are looking for substantial
similarity in copyright infringement cases.

But, whereas originally

60 See, in New Zealand, LB.M.v. ComputerImports Ltd, (1989) 14 I.P.R. 225, 2 N.Z.LR.
395 (H.C.); B. Smith, "Copyright Protection of Computer Software" (1989) 6 Auckland U.L.
Rev. 245; B. Brown, "Computer Software - Copyright Protection for Object Code in New
Zealand" (1989) 11:9 European Intellectual Prop. Rev. 330.
61 See Whelan Associates v. Jaslow DentalLaboratory Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 877 (1987); Broderbund Software Inc. v. Unison World Inc., 648 F.
Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Digital CommunicationsAssociates Inc. v. SoftKlone Distributing
Corp., 659 F. Supp. 499 (N.D. Ga. 1987). The U.S. Copyright Office has not supported
SoftIone. See R. Stem, 'The Copyright Office's Response to the SoftKlone Decision - Not
Serendipitous" (1988) 10:9 European Intellectual Prop. Rev. 255 at 280. The law review
literature is already voluminous. See, in particular, R. Stem, 'qhe Centre Will Not Hold Recent U.S. Developments in Protecting 'Idea' Aspects of Computer Software" (1987) 9:5
European Intellectual Prop. Rev. 125 [hereinafter Recent U.S. Developments]; D. Brinson,
"Copyrighted Software: Separating The Protected Expression From Unprotected Ideas, A
Starting Point" (1988) 29 B.C.L Rev. 803; S. Englund, "Idea, Process, or Protected
Expression?: Determining the Scope of Copyright Protection of the Structure of Computer
Programs" (1990) 88 Mich. L Rev. 866; K. Wiegner & J.Heins, "Giants Battle for Look and
Feel Patents" Business Review Weekly (17 March 1989) 76.
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they looked for similarity of form, today the focus is on similarity of
result. It is what judges perceive as bad conduct by defendants,
more than anything else, which gains judgments for plaintiffs. The
danger of this approach is, of course, that of an appropriate
yardstick for justice. Protection of form is measurable; conduct is
infinitely debatable. And in the end, the copyright statute aims at
a social, not an individual result.
D. Contract
The next strongest form of protection in law would lie in
contract law, which confers substantial rights at least as between the
parties to that contract. The law allows contract terms to restrict
the disclosure of information, provided that disclosure is reasonable
both as against the public and between the parties. At one time,
violation of these principles led to the term being unenforceable.
Now, under sensible law reform in some jurisdictions, a court can
modify the term to something more reasonable in appropriate
62
cases.

But can the subject-matter of such a term be an idea or a
fundamental concept such as e=mc2? In practice, clauses are drawn
every day which purport to protect ideas, but there is little caselaw authority on this point. In principle, there ought not to be an
objection to the protection, perhaps even of an abstract idea, under
such a clause. A contract creates no monopoly. It is effective only
between the parties. It does not withdraw the idea from general
circulation. Any party outside the contract is quite free to use it
without restrictions. The encumbered party simply agrees not to do
what they could otherwise do. And if the particular protection were
ever thought to be too great, there is the obvious control vehicle
that the protection must be reasonable as against the public. On
the other hand, today in high technology industries, almost
everybody is a specialist, and the orthodox body of law does not sit
all that well with this new reality. Perhaps it is this which is causing

62 See illegal ContractsAct 1970 (N.Z.).
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some judges, in more recent cases, to intuitively narrow the ambit of
63
protected subject-matter.
E. Tort
64
Some jurisdictions recognise a tort of unfair competition.
Where such a tort is recognised, it rests on a view that, for both
moral and economic reasons, unjustified free rider economic
behaviour should be proscribed. In jurisdictions which do recognise
such a tort, the problem of what subject-matter falls within it causes
problems. In this area, it is possible that courts will end-run the
copyright statute and create a right identical with Blackstone's
conception of a common law copyright in published works.
Certainly in New York, the centre of much of the literary and
artistic life of the United States, precisely this has happened. There,
the misappropriation doctrine of InternationalNews, in which Justice
Brandeis articulated his principle, extends to all forms of commercially marketed literary and artistic property.65 But at least the New
York courts have seen the problem and restricted the protection to
66
the author's expression, as opposed to mere ideas.
Other jurisdictions have powerful new statutory torts which
cover much of the ground which may once have been addressed by
general concepts of unfair competition. For instance, in New
Zealand, section 9 of the Fair Trading Act 1986 (which mirrors
Australian legislation) provides: "no person shall, in trade, engage
in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or

63 See, for example, Faccenda Chicken Ltd v. Fowler (1985), [1987] Ch. 117, [1986] 1
All E.R. 617 (CA).
64 For Canada, see ConsumersDistributingCo. v. Seiko Time CanadaLtd, [1984] 1 S.C.R.
583. The High Court of Australia delivered a crushing attack on the concept in Moorgate
Tobacco Co. v. Phillip Morris Ltd, [1985] 59 A.L.J.R. 77. The issue has not been finally
resolved in New Zealand.
65 Supra, note 13.
66

Pocket Books v. Meyers, 292 N.Y. 58, 54 N.E.2d 6 (Ct. App. 1944); Archie Comic Pub.
Inc. v. Am. News Co., 204 Misc. 1060, 125 N.Y.S.2d 919, aff'd, 129 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1954).
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deceive." 67 This section has already generated a significant volume
of litigation, and the principles under it are still evolving. For
instance, whether a misrepresentation, and if so of what kind, is
required before the section comes into play, is a matter of real
importance. Another is that some judges have suggested that the
section should not be read down by reference to the existing body
of intellectual property law. 8 On such a view, this provision is like
the famous fault provision in continental codes. 69 It stands naked
and ready for an emperor's clothes. Before it is finally clothed,
perhaps I could respectfully suggest that one undergarment might be
Justice Brandeis's principle. Parliament surely did not intend,
without a very specific and informed statement, to have displaced
that entire body of learning from our law? It would be an
unfortunate thing indeed if these new provisions were utilized to
end-run one of the central planks of intellectual property law.
F. Equity
Prior to the evolution of copyright as we now know it,
chancellors protected unpublished manuscripts, and subsequently all
sorts of other confidences, in conscience. The governing principle
today is said to be very broad: "[A person] who has received
information in confidence shall not take unfair advantage of it." 70
The elements of the cause of action are that the information must
Fair TradingAct 1986 (N.Z.).
68 Taylor Bros Ltd v. Taylors Group Ltd, [1988] 2 N.Z.L.R. 1 at 27, McGechan J.(H.C.).
The decision of the Court of Appeal is at [1988] 2 N.Z.L.R. 33. See also Fair Trading Act
1986 (N.Z.), supra, note 67. See also Dominion Rent A CarLtd v. Budget Rent A Car Systems
(1970) Ltd, [1987] 2 N.Z.L.R. 395 (C.A.); Taylor Bros Ltd v. Taylors Group Ltd, [1990] 1
N.Z.L.R. 19 (C.A.); A.Brown & A. Grant, The Law Of intellectualProperty in New Zealand
(Wellington, N.Z.: Butterworths, 1989) c. 7. In Australia, see ParkdaleCustom Built Furniture
v. Puxu Pty Ltd,[1982] 149 C.L.R. 141 (H.C.); W. Pengilley, "Section 52 of the Trade Practices
Act: A Plaintiff's New Exocet?" (1987) 15 Aust. Bus. L. Rev. 247; P. Clarke, 'The Hegemony
of Misleading or Deceptive Conduct in Contract, Tort and Restitution" (1989) 5 Aust. Bar
Rev. 109.
69 See Art. 1053, C-CQ; Art. 1382, C. Civ. And see generally M. Bourgeois, "Protecting
Business Confidences: A Comparative Study of French and Quebec Law" (1987) 3 I.P.J. 259.
70 Fraserv. Evans, [1969] 1 All E.R. 8 at 11, Denning L.J. (CA).
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not be publicly known; that it was imparted in circumstances giving
rise to an obligation of confidence; and that there was an
unauthorized use of the information, without just cause or excuse.
The courts have not finally resolved whether detriment is an
element, and if so, quite what that means.
Recently, in England, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand,
claims have been made that "ideas" in Lord Mansfield's concept of
"notions" are protected under this head of equity jurisdiction. 7 The
idea or format for a television show (though well short of a script)
has been protected. As one court put it:
The Court will prevent a person who has received an idea expressed in oral or
written form from disclosing it for an unlimited period or until that idea becomes
general public knowledge provided that (a) the circumstances in which it was
communicated imported an obligation of confidence and (b) that the content of the
idea is clearly identifiable, 72
original, of potential commercial attractiveness, and
capable of reaching fruition.

And, going even further, one Canadian court has suggested that the
unconsented-to use of an idea can amount to unjust enrichment.
The idea in that case fell short of something of the stature of
Milton's or Shakespeare's work. It was an idea for a73 lottery based
on numbers to be printed in the weekend TV guide.
What we have in these equity cases is judges creating a new
control system for ideas outside copyright. They are doing so by
saying that a notion or a format will be protected by the various
relational causes of action in equity. This is not supplementary
jurisprudence in the classical equity sense. This is equity leading the
way, as it did in the eighteenth century. The critical conceptual

71 ibid. Talbot v. General Television CorporationPty Ltd, [1981] R.P.C. 1 (S.C. Vict.);
PromotivateInternationalInc. v. Toronto Star NewspapersLtd (1985), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 196, 8
C.P.R. (3d) 546 (Ont. H.C.). The Law Commission and the Alberta Institute of Law
Research and Reform proposed statutory schemes with respect to certain kinds of confidential
information. See U.K, Law Commission, Breach of Confidence (Law Com.; no. 110)
(London: H.M.S.O., 1985); Alberta Institute of Law Research and Reform, Trade Secrets
(Report No. 46) (Edmonton: The Institute, University of Alberta, 1986). Others have
opposed such regimes. See, for example, P.S. Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory in English Law
(London: Stevens & Sons, 1987) at 163-65.
72

Fraserv. Evans, supra, note 70.

73

PromotivateInternationalInc. v. Toronto Star, supra, note 71.
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features of this resurgent equity jurisprudence are the elements of
"originality" and "concreteness." The element of originality needs
further elaboration in the cases. If what is meant is merely that a
plaintiff must show independent creation - that the idea was not
copied from another - then that seems appropriate, if protection is
to be granted. But if the requirement is more like that for novelty
in a patent law sense, a much greater, and perhaps inappropriate,
burden is raised. Concreteness raises the same difficulties as the
copyright cases. And why in breach of confidence actions should
commercial feasibility be required? Are we to take it that an action
which amongst other things protects marital confidences has
transmogrified into the equitable analogue of an economic tort?
Indeed, is breach of confidence now equity's tort of unfair
competition?
V. HOW FAR HAS THE BASIC PARADIGM BEEN ERODED?
This essay has traversed over three hundred years of time
and a good deal of law in those countries that follow the common
law tradition. It may be useful at this point to summarise the
position as I see it.
First, a caution. I have sketched the developments around
the common law world.
Not all of them are occurring
simultaneously in every jurisdiction. It is dangerous to suggest a
whole cloth out of pieces in different households. And, as always
in the law, change is uneven, but discernible. That said, in the most
general way, Justice Brandeis's principle still applies. But it is an
open question whether the centre is truly holding. The fragile bird
cage, under rough handling, may be falling apart. One distinguished
American commentator has said in this context, "A rough beast
(Blake would number him triple sixes) slouches towards birth, and
a new Millennium spirals towards us in widening gyres."74 What is
Recent US. Developments, supra, note 61 at 125. The allusion is to Yeats's 'The
Second Coming":
Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer,
Things fall apart, the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world ...
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driving this writhing mass of doctrine are the new technologies.
These have produced fundamental socio-economic change. They
have increasingly given rise to information-driven, service-based
economies. Within such economies, information and ideas are
increasingly commodified, as opposed to being treated as a
resource. 75 The new technologies have also fed the apparently
limitless appetite of humankind for entertainment. Information technology and entertainment are the two fastest growing economic
sectors in the world. It is not surprising, therefore, that this is
where the critical case-law developments are taking place.
There has to be real concern with the relational causes of
action. Because these focus on perceived bad faith or bad conduct,
they lend themselves, not by design, but in their effect, to end-runs
around the intellectual property statutes. And in many ways, what
the courts are doing is recreating under these causes of action the
old eighteenth century concept of a common law copyright that
Blackstone created, Lord Mansfield tried to establish, and
Parliaments have said must not be. The effects of contract law are
largely hidden, but the contract terms themselves grow ever more
onerous. There is increasing utilisation of the criminal law to
protect knowledge-based assets. Copyright is under pressure. First,
because separating an idea from its expression is so difficult in
relation to the new technologies. Second, because of the consistent
pressure to enlarge the scope of the statute by judicial construction:
"In the new Millennium, ideas are called expressions and are
protected under copyright, which saves the owners of these new
proprietary rights the inconvenience of dealing with the Patent office
and of complying with its old-fashioned ways."76 The Australasian

See W.B. Yeats, The Poems, R. Finneran, ed. (New York- MacMillan Publishing, 1983) at
187. I had previously used the same allusion in Misappropriation,supra, note 46.
75 See G. Hammond, "Quantum Physics, Econometric Models and Property Rights to
Information" (1981) 27 McGill LJ. 47 [hereinafter Quantum Physics]; A.S. Weinrib,
"Information and Property" (1988) 38 U.T.LJ. 117; D. Libling, 'The Concept of Property:

Property in Intangibles" (1978) 94 L.Q. Rev. 103; H. Dordick, Information Technology and
Economic Growth in New Zealand (Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria University

Press, 1987).
76 Recent U.S. Developments, supra, note 61 at 125.
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fair trading act provisions 77 are a ready loose cannon and the
current darling of the Australasian Bar. While there is no reason
why lawyers should heed Melville's warning that terse law is no law
- a lawyer does after all have the responsibility to advance every
argument - it is apparent that the sections were poorly conceived
and drafted. Judges have to decide particular cases, rather than
dealing with system. Concern has been expressed in some appellate
judgments at these developments, but
that alone will not stem the
78
growing tide of legal protectionism.
VI. THE WAY FORWARD?
Intellectual property is a difficult subject area. The courts
cope as best they can at the micro-level of individual cases. They
try to do justice as they see it, whilst paying some regard to the
overall system. In this part, my concern is with the way forward at
the macro-level. This is oppressively difficult. The dilemmas arise
under a variety of heads. Those I propose to touch on here are
social vision, theory, and political response. At the end of the day,
whatever approach is settled on involves a consensus on the values
and issues involved and a workable technocratic solution for the
support of those values. Both ideals and technique must come
together.
A. Social Vision
I have suggested that the root cause of the problems I have
been addressing is the now pervasive technological dimension of the
human condition. This has two distinctive effects. First, it puts a
premium on intellectual activities. Second, in various ways, it
encourages individuals to atomize themselves and sell every facet of
77

For New Zealand, see Fair TradingAct 1986, supra, note 67. For Australia, see Trade

PracticesAct 1974 (Aust.).
78 See CB.S. Songs v. Amstrad, [1988] 2 W.LR. 1191 (H.L); Re The Coca.Cola
Company, (1986) 6 I.P.R. 275. See also V. Porter, "Copyright: The New Protectionism"
(1989) 17 Inter Media 10.
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their being.79 This I have termed "the problem of the commodity
self." How are we to respond to these phenomena?
Three giants of Canadian intellectual thought suggest a range
of possibilities. First, there is the philosopher George Grant, whose
stunning Lament For A Nation is a Scottish keen for the technological dependency of personkind. 0 Marshall McLuhan is at the
other end of the spectrum of response, with a vision of technological
determinism. As McLuhan saw it, the fact that technology exists in
and of itself changes everything. We are not masters of our own
destiny in the global village, and the sooner we get on with a
technological utopia the better.81 In between lies the political
economist Harold Innis, who struggled to mediate humanism and
technological dependency. His is a vision of attaining balance
between the claims of culture (society) and empire (power).8 2
These three thinkers are emblematic. They indicate that in terms of
social theory the choice is between lament, utopia, and political
struggle. Innis has to be closest to the world of realistic responses.
Even if one accepted totally the theses of Grant and McLuhan,
human dignity, if nothing else, would still require a struggle. We
have to evolve a political response to the problem of technology and
the proper protection of knowledge-based assets without damaging
a central facet of our human heritage - the commonality of ideas.
How is this to be done?

79 The same tendency can be seen in the recent decision in Moore v. Regents of the
University of California, 202 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1988). It was held that a cell-line derived by

researchers from a diseased spleen which had been surgically removed was the personal
property of the plaintiff. See Braudy, supra, note 40 at 370-71.
80

Lament ForA Nation (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1982). See also G. Grant,
Tne asHistory (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1969); Technology and Empire:
Perspectives on North America (Toronto: House of Anansi, 1969).
81The Medium is the Message (New York: Bantam Books, 1967); UnderstandingMedia:
The Extensions of Man (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964).
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Empire and Communications (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972); The Bias
of Communications (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951).
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B. Theory
Part of the problem lies in the paucity of our thought, and
might therefore logically be assisted by more and better theory. Our
language and intellectual concepts are seriously deficient in the area
of knowledge-based assets 8 3 For instance, the concept of property
has not evolved to meet the new realities. For Blackstone, property
was physical and absolute. That was why he treated ideas like
easements, and perpetual ones at that. Hohfeld dragged us into
the twentieth century with his concept that property is simply a
bundle of rights, albeit the largest rights of use and enjoyment the
law will allow. 4 But neither property in the Hohfeldian sense, nor
relational theories of obligations will do when, for instance, two
different and independently created languages can simultaneously
raise the same creation at the same instant, and both claim
exclusivity. Finding a new theory of property, or some other way of
viewing things, which will give new meaning in contemporary society
will not be easy. And we should not beg the issue. It may not be
just tort and contract that are, in the eyes of many, dying. Property
as a legal paradigm may also be facing extinction. Much lawyering
is a form of social technology, and our contemporary classifications
and concepts are seriously outmoded for this kind of living problem.
C. PoliticalResponse
If we must struggle for our answers, what might be the
content and form of a response to the problem of the erosion of
this paradigm? First, it may be that the thrust of the case-law
developments outlined in this article are wrong, and the courts
should forthrightly recognise this. The courts have largely assumed,
without rigorous examination, that a case has been made: out for

83 1 made the same point a decade ago. See Quantum Physics, supra, note 75; R.
Cotterell, "T'he Law of Property and Legal Theory" in W. Twining, ed., Legal Theory and
Common Law (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) at 81.
84 W. Hohfeld, FundamentalLegal Conceptions (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1923). See also R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York. Basic Books, 1974).
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incursions by them into the basic paradigm, at least in some areas of
human endeavour. Some commentators have supported them.85
Perhaps, a greater degree of scepticism is appropriate. The historic
rationales of intellectual property law lay primarily in promoting
science and the useful and performing arts. What mattered was a
relationship between an "author" or an "inventor" and that person's
"work." While those rationales have not entirely disappeared, the
principle thrust of intellectual property law today is to protect
investment in knowledge-based assets in the interests of economic
growth and jobs. As noted, individuals have themselves embraced
the new technologies in an unholy alliance. But I doubt if, even
adopting an overtly economic rationale, the protection of formats
for TV shows - though doubtless important to the industry and
artistic persons within it - is a matter of such compelling economic
moment as to warrant the sort of destruction of principle as is being
suggested by the case-law developments. Neither are the problems
of software producers. Merely reclassifying the particular commodity
into an existing category of the law (as for instance "format" into
"copyright") is an evasion. Neither is it a question of when a flavour
becomes a poison. An important and enduring humanistic principle
is being sacrificed to relatively short term economic ends.
Second, if I am wrong and these kinds of problems are
thought to be of compelling concern, it would surely be better to
limit incursion into the basic paradigm by enacting statutory
provisions limiting that incursion to the particular subject-matter
requiring protection. That is, any incursion should be formulated as
a strictly construed exception to the basic paradigm.8 6 Specific
amendments or sui generis legislation, as with microchips, are far
more preferable solutions.
Third, there is a strong case for substantial law reform.
Resources and legislative time should be directed to the evolution
of unified codes of technology, which will sweep up all the relevant
statutory provisions and judicial innovations, refining, restating, and

85 See NV. Cornish, "Confidence in Ideas" (1990) 1 I.PJ. Aust. 1.
86 This approach is the one taken, as a matter of legal methodology, by the Canadian
Supreme Court in R v. Stewart, supra, note 49.
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reforming them where necessary 8 7 Some progress is being made in
this general direction, but it is conservative and halting. The United
Kingdom and Australia have recently introduced statutes which
consolidate several formerly discrete areas of intellectual property
law. But draftspersons and legislators have still not been prepared
to move sufficiently far in the direction of fundamental reform and
principled codes which will leave room for subsequent judicial
application. One principle within such a code should be the
nonappropriability of ideas. The arguments advanced by some
commentators that legislators cannot act, or act too slowly because
of unremitting pressure by multifarious interest groups, or that if
they do act they will get it wrong, are no justification for the
present judicial incursions. 88 Courts are, in the main, quite limited
instruments of public policy articulation and application, and are at
their best when boundaries have been mapped out. Judges need a
ball park.
Fourth, within such a code, a great deal of attention needs
to be paid to what might be termed demarcation problems. That in
fact is where most of the technical problems are occurring today.
As only one instance, when idea person X approaches company Y
with a shiny new idea for a shiny new TV show, and assuming some
kind of legal protection is thought to be appropriate, should X
expect to be governed by the law of contract and to settle disclosure
terms in advance of disclosure? Or should X be free to disclose,
secure in the knowledge that something called "equity" or "breach of
confidence" will come to the rescue if that person's idea is
misappropriated? The failure to bring ideals and technique together
leads not just to confusion and inefficiency. The real values at stake
become obscured, or even set to one side, as lawyers play
classification games for the private advantage of clients8 9 I am not
87

See also D. Davidson, "Common Law, Uncommon Software" (1986) 47 U. Pitt. L Rev.

1037.
88 I do not underestimate the difficulty of getting respectable legislation passed. For a

review of the difficulties in the recent evolution of the U.S. copyright legislation, see J.
Litman, "Copyright Legislation and Technological Change" (1989) 68 Or. L Rev. 275. For an
argument for judicial creation of intellectual property rights, see D. Rosen, "A Common Law
for the Ages of Intellectual Property Law" (1984) 38 U. Miami L Rev. 769.

89 See J. Feinman, "The Jurisprudence of Classification" (1989) 41 Stan. L. Rev. 661.
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sanguine that that phenomenon is about to disappear in the common
law world, even assuming a shiny new code. But I do think a
sounder, more publicly accessible law is distinctly achievable. The
simple removal of the ability to play one or both ends against the
middle would go some distance towards sustaining the paradigm, if
we think it worth defending.

